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Comments
UNEMPLoYmENT INsufuccE-QuALIcATON FOR B=rrrs OF AN EM-
PLOYEE RETRED UNDER A MANDATORY RETrEmENT PLA-Claimant
began his employment in 1942. He was not represented by a collec-
tive bargaining agent although the employees of the company had
elected representatives to confer with the employer with respect to
work rules, conditions, and policy. In 1960 the employer instituted
a policy whereby no employee would be allowed to continue em-
ployment after his sixty-fifth birthday. The committeemen elected
by the employees acquiesced in the plan which made no provision
for pension benefits. In 1963 claimant having reached the manda-
tory retirement age was retired. Claimant's eligibility to receive un-
employment insurance benefits was challenged by the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission which ruled that claimant was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for the duration
of his unemployment. The Commission's ruling was based on Ky.
Rev. Stat. 341.370 [hereinafter cited as KRS], which provided in
pertinent part that (2) A worker shall be disqualified from receiv-
ing benefits ... for the duration of any period of unemployment with
respect to which: . .. (c) He has left his most recent suitable work
voluntarily without good cause. On appeal by claimant the Com-
mission's order was reversed by the Jefferson Circuit Court, which
was appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Held: Affirmed.
On these facts the claimant was not disqualified by KRS 341.370 from
receiving unemployment benefits. Kentucky Unemployment Insur-
ance Commission v. Young, 389 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1965).
It is a settled principle of law that an employee who becomes
unemployed, or a claimant who remains unemployed, through a
yoluntary act is not entitled to receive unemployment compensa-
tion.1 Application of this principle, however, has proved difficult
in cases concerning claimants unemployed through the operation of
mandatory retirement plans. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has
faced this issue on two previous occasions, but on different factual
situations. In Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v.
Kroehler Mfg. Co s the claimants had become unemployed by oper-
181 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 164 (1953); 48 Am. Jur.
Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Etc. § 35 (1943).
352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961).
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ation of mandatory retirement plans which had been embraced in
their collective bargaining agreements, but in that case the em-
ployees had participated in the plan by their individual requests
with no compulsion upon them to join. Furthermore, the employees
were permitted to withdraw from the program prior to retirement
age with an accompanying withdrawal of his contributions to the
pension funds. The Court held that these claimants had volun-
tarily become unemployed, stating by way of dictum that:
The purpose of the General Assembly in the enactment of such legis-
lation was to provide benefits for only those employees who have been
forced to leave their employment because of forces beyontl their con-
trol and not because of any voluntary act of their own.
3
In Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Reynolds
Metals Company4 the court followed the same line of reasoning in
holding that a claimant who was unemployed by operation of the
retirement plan embodied in his union's collective bargaining agree-
ment had voluntarily abandoned his employment and was disquali-
fied to receive unemployment benefits by KRS 341.370(2)(c). In
applying the rule of Kroehler,5 the court pointed out that in both cases
the claimants had voluntarily accepted plans which provided for
the termination of their employment.
Thus on the eve of the decision in Young" it was established
that an employee who became unemployed by a retirement plan
which he had accepted either personally or through his collective
bargaining agent had voluntarily become unemployed within the
meaning of KRS 341.370(2)(c). This is the position taken by half
of the courts which have decided the issue,7 and would seem logically
to be the most sound.
In its opinion in Young s the court again applied the statutory
standard of voluntariness. In the court's own words "[T]he important
31d. at 214.
4 360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962).
G 852 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961).
6389 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1965).
7 The following courts have reached essentially the same conclusions as the
Kentucky court: Lamont v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 387
Mass. 328, 149 N.E.2d 372 (1958); Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baldng Co., 252
Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958); Ferrill v. Leach, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 545, 186
N.E.2d 868 (1962). Courts holding contra, usually on the ground that stated
statutory policy prohibits waiver of rights to compensation are: Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Thowe, 272 Ala. 709, 133 So. 2d 713 (1961); Employment Security
Commissioner v. Magma Copper Co., 90 Ariz. 104, 866 P.2d 84 (1961); Camp-
bell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, Division of Employment "Security, 13 N.J.
431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953); Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board,
396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959). See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 885
(1963).
8389 S.V.2d 451 (Ky. 1965).
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and controlling question ... is, was his employment discontinued
voluntarily by [claimant] ... or his authorized agent?" Despite this
emphasis on the test of voluntariness, the court refused to hold
claimant disqualified. This interjects new elements into the test of
qualification. First, the court by distinguishing the Reynolds9 case
has made it known that before an employee's voluntary acceptance
of a plan through collective acquiescence will be construed as his
own acceptance, the employee must be represented by at least a
truly representative employees' association. Further adjudication
must be had before the bench and bar will know the full extent
of this requirement. Second, the court alluded to the fact that there
was no pension provided for by the retirement plan. While it is
probable that the court mentioned the absence of a pension as a
factor militating against a conclusion of voluntary acceptance of
the plan by claimant, it might well prove that the absence of bene-
fits under a retirement plan will become prima facie evidence of
involuntary unemployment by the retired employee. It is interesting
to note that a majority of the courts which have considered the
issue have ruled that a retired employee receiving pension benefits
is not at the same time eligible for unemployment benefits.' 0
The present law in Kentucky on the issue of a mandatorily re-
tired employee's qualification under KRS 341.370(2)(c) is a com-
bination of Reynolds, Kroehler, and Young. It is submitted that
while the court correctly decided the issue before it in the Young
case, the loose language concerning the claimant's representation
by the committeemen and the absence of a pension plan has cast
doubt upon the heretofore established test of voluntariness. Any
future litigation to resolve the doubt could have been avoided by a
closer compliance with the previously established test.
William R. Harris
CONsTIrUTIoNAL LAw-CoNNEIcCuT STATUTE FoBIDING Tm USE OF
ANY DRuG, MEDICINAL ARTICLE OR INSTRumT FOR THE PURPOsE oF
PREVmN G CONCEPTION STRuCK DowN.- Appellants Griswold and
Buxton,. the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and the League's Medical Director respectively, were
arrested as accessories for giving information and advice to married
persons and for prescribing the best contraceptive device or ma-
9360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962).
'OAnnot., 32 A.L.R.2d 901 (1953).
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